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BLD-237 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1864 
___________ 
 
RICKY FRANKS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GLOUCESTER COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE; MARY PIFFER; DET. JOHN 
KOMOROWSKI, #0812; EMPLOYEES OF SUSQUEHANNA BANK 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1:12-cv-01681) 
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 14, 2018 
 
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 20, 2018) 
_________  
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Ricky Franks appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey denying his motion to reopen a civil rights action.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.  
 In March 2012, while Franks was a pretrial detainee in Gloucester County Jail, he 
filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He named as defendants 
the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office, a prosecutor from that office, a detective from 
Philadelphia, and employees of Susquehanna Bank.  Franks’ complaint included the 
following allegations: that he was wrongfully arrested, that officers executed a false 
police report against him, that he was falsely imprisoned, that defendants’ defamed his 
character, that he suffered from the effects of racial profiling, and that prosecutors 
engaged in a conspiracy to frame him for a crime he did not commit. 
 In April 2012, the District Court denied Franks’ application to proceed in forma 
pauperis and administratively terminated the case due to his failure to pay the required 
filing fee.  The order stated that the case may be reopened if Franks either paid the 
required filing fee or submitted a completed application to proceed in forma pauperis, 
within 30 days of the order.  Franks failed to pay the required fee, submit a completed 
application to proceed in forma pauperis, or otherwise respond to the order within 30 
days.  Five years later, in November 2017 and March 2018, Franks filed three letters 
requesting that the District Court reopen his case.  The District Court denied these 
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requests, 1 and Franks filed a timely notice of appeal.  Franks subsequently filed a motion 
for appointment of counsel and a motion to subpoena defendants with this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We construe Franks’ motion 
to reopen as a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and review the 
denial of such motion for abuse of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 
244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 On appeal, Franks asserts that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 
60(b)(6).  Regarding Rule 60(b)(1), whether neglect is excusable is an essentially 
equitable determination that takes into account all relevant circumstances surrounding a 
litigant’s failure to file.  George Harms Constr. Co., Inc. v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (citing Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1995)).  However, 
a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) must be made “no more than a year after the entry of the 
judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).  Because 
Franks’ letters were filed more than five years after the District Court closed his case, he 
is not eligible for relief under that section. 
 “[A] movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) [must] show ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.”  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 
                                              
1 In his letter to the District Court in March 2018, Franks attached the judgment from 
another civil rights case, filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, based on the same 
facts as the instant case.  In that case, the Court determined that Franks was falsely 
arrested and awarded him $7,500 in damages.  In the instant case, in addition to declining 
to grant Franks’ motion to reopen because Franks did not file it within a reasonable time, 
the District Court also found that Franks was precluded from relitigating the same claims 
in a different court.  Dkt # 7, at 3 n.1. 
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U.S. 524, 535 (2005).  Franks argues that extraordinary circumstances prevented him 
from receiving the District Court’s order and litigating his case, including; incarceration, 
participation in impatient drug rehabilitation, homelessness, and residence at a divested 
domestic violence home for men.  However, Franks’ argument is undercut by his active 
participation in his concurrent case in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Franks initiated a concurrent civil rights case in March 2012, which was 
decided, in his favor, in August 2013.  Franks has not provided an explanation as to why 
he was able to continue litigating one case, but not the other.  Therefore, we conclude that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in administratively terminating Franks’ 
action and ordering the case closed. 
 Because Franks’ appeal lacks arguable merit we will deny his motion for 
appointment of counsel, deny his motion to subpoena defendants, and affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
